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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE FOR
ATTORNEY-EMPLOYEES IN PRIVATE
PRACTICE: TO DO, OR NOT TO DO, THE
"RIGHT THING"
TERRI MARTIN KIRIK*

INTRODUCTION

You are a licensed attorney working as an associate for a
private law firm. After a few years of employment, you are
promoted to office manager and you report directly to the firm's
partners.!
Your new responsibilities include supervising the
collection department, along with reviewing and signing consumer
debt collection complaints. Things are looking rosy, so in addition
to making your law school loan payments, you purchase a larger
home and buy a second car. However, you discover that your firm
is filing consumer debt collection actions in violation of the venue
provisions of federal and state laws.2 You speak with your law
firm's principal partner about the problem and he tells you it will
be corrected. When you discover that the violations continue, do
you refuse to sign the collection complaints and again approach
the partner with your concerns?
You are placed in a moral and ethical dilemma. You realize
that your employer's conduct is illegal. You are quite aware of
your ethical obligations as an attorney to avoid participating in
unlawful practices and to report misconduct. You also know that
you have mortgage payments to make and school loans to repay.
But it appears that your employer is bent on doing the "wrong
thing."
Perhaps you visit the partner again and a short time later,
you are relieved of your responsibilities in the collection
department. A few weeks later, you are fired. You feel this
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School, June 1999. Ms. Kirik is an
attorney with the law firm of Pappas & Schnell, P.C. in Rock Island, Illinois,
where she practices employment law. The Author extends deep appreciation

to Stuart R. Lefstein, Esq., of Rock Island, Illinois, for his endless
encouragement.

1. This scenario is based upon the facts in Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga,
P.C., 688 N.E.2d 813 (IM.App. Ct. 1997), rev'd, 706 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. 1998).
2. See Jacobson, 688 N.E.2d at 814 for details of Mr. Jacobson's complaint.
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termination is in retaliation for your insistence that the law firm
do the "right thing." Do you have a cause of action against your
employer, or are you precluded from such a retaliatory discharge
action? According to the Illinois Supreme Court, an attorney who
takes the ethical high road by following the Rules of Professional
Responsibility does not have the foundation for a claim of
retaliatory discharge. 3
This Article maintains that a claim for retaliatory discharge
should be afforded to attorneys who are fired by law firms for
refusing to violate the law and/or their professional ethics." This
remedy would encourage attorneys to do the "right thing" when
their employers are bent on doing "the wrong thing."' Part I of
this Article reviews the law of at-will employment and the
exceptions to at-will firing.
Part II examines the ethical
obligations of attorneys and compares the attorney-client
relationship of in-house attorneys with the obligations of attorneys
employed by private law firms. Part III discusses wrongful
discharge lawsuits attorneys file and the remedies available, if
any. Finally, Part IV proposes that a public policy under a
professional code exception to the at-will employment doctrine be
extended to attorney-employees fired by their law firm for refusing
to violate the law and/or their professional ethics.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

[Tihe employer is not so absolute a sovereign of the job that
6
there are not limits to his prerogative.
Historically, under the common law, employers were entitled
3. Jacobson, 706 N.E.2d at 494 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
4. This Article will focus on the private law firm attorney-employee's claim
for retaliatory discharge. For extensive discussions regarding in-house and
corporate counsels' right to sue for retaliatory discharge, see Sara A. Corello,
In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. REV.

389 (1992); Raymis H.C. Kim, In-House Counsel's Wrongful DischargeAction
Under the Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrine, 67

WASH. L. REV. 893 (1992); John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Establishing Corporate
Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343
(1995); Elliot M. Lonker, Note, General Dynamics v. Superior Court: One
Giant Step Forward for In-House Counsel or One Small Step Back to the

Status Quo?, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 277 (1995); Patricia Leigh O'Dell, Retaliatory
Discharge: Corporate Counsel in a Catch-22, 44 ALA. L. REV. 573 (1993);

Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 553 (1988); and Michael P. Sheehan, Retaliatory Discharge of
In-House Counsel: A Cause of Action-Ethical Obligations v. FiduciaryDuties,
45 DEPAUL L. REV. 859 (1996).
5. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ill. 1991) (Freeman, J.,

dissenting). Justice Freeman commented that ethical incentives alone are not
sufficient when "doing 'the right thing' will often result in termination by an
employer bent on doing the 'wrong thing.' Id. at 113.
6. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980).
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to hire and fire employees as they pleased! An employer could
discharge an at-will employee for good cause, no cause or even bad
cause, without incurring legal liability!8
However, the
circumstances behind many firings, such as discharging a longterm employee to avoid compensation obligations 9 or firing an
employee who filed a workers' compensation claim" or terminating

a worker who refused to commit perjury," cried out for legal
remedy. Today, the employer's right to terminate his employees is
not absolute. Recognized exceptions to the at-will doctrine are
generally based upon theories of contract and tort, as well as
statutory remedies. Some jurisdictions limit wrongful discharge
actions to breach of contract claims,"2 some allow public policy
exceptions to at-will discharge under the tort of retaliatory
discharge,"2 and other jurisdictions recognize claims under both

7. Payne v. Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (Tenn. 1884).
8. Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 846 (Kan. 1987). See also
Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 1964)
(holding that employers were free to fire without notice and for any reason or

no reason); Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (D. Kan. 1995)
(noting that in the absence of an express or implied contract of duration,
employment is terminable at the will of either party); Mack v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co., 880 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
an employee's at-will employment could be terminated at the pleasure of
either the employee or the employer); Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc.,
645 N.E.2d 877, 879 (II. 1994) (noting that "a noncontracted employee is one
who serves at the employer's will, and the employer may discharge such an
employee for any reason or no reason"); McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal
Specialists, Inc., 696 A.2d 173, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (quoting Field v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)) (stating
that Pennsylvania courts have protected the employer's "unfetterred right to
discharge an at-will employee for any or no reason in the absence of a
contractual or statutory prohibition").
9. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1258 (Mass.
1977).
10. Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978).
11. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25,
28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
12. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988)
(adopting the exclusive contract approach, but noting that if an employer's
conduct is "egregious" in breaching the employment contract, "the employee
can still claim tort damages on a cause of action for outrage"); Fortune, 364
N.E.2d at 1255-56 (holding that defendant's written contract contained an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in
good faith is a breach of the contract); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983) (holding that a contract theory is most
appropriate since a discharge action is based upon implied provisions of the
contract for employment).
13. Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 258 (Ariz. 1986); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (II. 1981). See Kobus, supra
note 4, at 1345-46 and accompanying footnotes for a listing of states adopting
the public policy exception.
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theories of contract and tort. 4 However, there are cases in
jurisdictions where a plaintiffs status as an attorney will prevent
any remedy at all for wrongful termination. 5 Section A looks at
the employment contract and its implied terms. Section B
discusses the tort of retaliatory discharge and the public policy
exceptions to the at-will doctrine, as well as statutes enacted to
protect employees from wrongful discharge.
A. The Employment Contract
The general rule regarding employment contracts is that if
the contract is for a definite term, the employee may be discharged
before the expiration of the term only for breach of a contractual
provision or other "good cause."1" Like most employees, the
majority of attorneys employed by law firms do not have a written
contract of employment containing a durational provision. In
searching for a solution to the problem of unfair termination using
a contract analysis, courts may look beyond the express terms of
an employment contract to the implied term of an oral or written
contract, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
the employee handbook.17
1. The At-Will Presumption in the Employment Setting
While an employment contract is presumed to be terminable
at will, this presumption is rebuttable if evidence exists of an
implied condition to the contrary.18
Additionally, some
jurisdictions recognize that while an employer may fire an at-will
employee for good cause or no cause, the employer has a duty to
the employee to refrain from terminating the employment for bad
cause. 19
14. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
15. See Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Iln. 1998)

(holding that an attorney employed by a private law firm does not have an
action for retaliatory discharge against its attorney-employer); Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ill. 1991) (refusing to allow in-house
attorney to sue his employer because the employee-attorney obeyed his ethical
obligations); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343,
348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding there is no cause of action for retaliatory

discharge by an attorney whose employment is terminated by a client). See
discussion infra Part III.A.
16. Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 605 P.2d 963, 965
(Idaho 1980).
17. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
18. Id. However, good motives do not overcome this strong presumption in
favor of at-will employment. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174,
179-80 (Pa. 1974).
19. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz.
1985). But see Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Ala. 1990)
(holding that an employer has a right to terminate an at-will employee even if
it does so "maliciously or for some other improper reason").
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In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,20 a court concluded that an
employer's oral statements established an implied contract.1
Pugh, an employee who worked his way from dishwasher to a vice
presidential position, was with See's Candies for thirty-two years.'
During his employment, Pugh was recognized for his
accomplishments, never criticized for his performance, and never
denied a raise or a bonus.2 Pugh's employer frequently told him
that "if you are loyal to [See's] and do a good job, your future is
secure."' Under the "totality of the relationship" between Pugh
and his employer, the court held that a jury could find an implied
promise of continued employment that would allow him to be fired
only for cause.25
2.

The Implied Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing

To determine whether the protection of an implied promise of
continued employment exists, courts consider a variety of factors.
These factors include (1) the employer's personnel policies or
practices, (2) the employee's longevity of service, (3) the employer's
actions or communication reflecting assurance of continued
The Restatement
employment, and (4) industry practices.26
(Second) of Contracts states that "every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
or its enforcement."27 A minority of courts have extended this duty
to employment contracts and applied this implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to terminable-at-will employment
contracts. 5 These jurisdictions limit remedies for a breach of the
covenant to contract damages, rather than recognizing the cause of
action as a tort.2

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

171 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 919.
Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
Id. at 925-26.

27.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

205 (1981).

28. Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Alaska 1989);
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744,748 (Idaho 1989); Prout v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288, 291 (Mont. 1989). See also Morriss v.
Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 850-51 (Kan. 1987) for a non-inclusive list of

jurisdictions adopting the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which include, in part, Petersen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of
Puerto Rico, 617 F. Supp. 1039 (D. V.I. 1985); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226
Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Cilley v. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc., 514
A.2d 818 (N.H. 1986); Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 713 P.2d 1027
(Okla. 1986) and Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.

1986).
29. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz.
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The majority of jurisdictions, however, reject the implied
covenant in the context of employment at-will."0 The refusal stems
from concern that adoption of the covenant "would place undue
restrictions on management and would infringe on the employer's
legitimate exercise of management discretion."31 In Calleon v.
Miyagi,2 the Supreme Court of Hawaii declined to adopt the Pugh
rationale and "refused to follow a minority of other jurisdictions in
implying a good faith requirement into every employment
situation, thereby 'subjecting each discharge to judicial incursions
into the amorphous concept of bad faith.'" "
3. Employee Handbooks
A personnel manual or employee handbook that includes
substantive provisions for a required procedure before termination
occurs, or imposes a system of progressive discipline before firing,
could be found to be contractually enforceable.'
An employee
handbook may create an enforceable contract when the necessary
requirements to form a contract are present.' The handbook must
be disseminated in a manner so that an employee is aware of its
contents, and it must contain a clear promise that an employee
would reasonably believe to be an offer. 6 Additionally, the
employee must accept the offer by continuing to work. 7 The

1985) (holding that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of
contract compensable only by contract damages); Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 373 (Cal. 1988) (holding same); Metcalf, 778 P.2d at 748
(holding same).
30. See Morriss, 738 P.2d at 851 (rejecting the application of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment at-will contracts
because such a covenant is overly broad). Morriss contains a non-inclusive list
of jurisdictions rejecting the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the context of employment at-will. Id. The list includes, in part, Minihan v.
American PharmaceuticalAss'n, 812 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Borowski v.
Vitro Corp., 634 F. Supp. 252 (D. Md. 1986); Salazar v. Furr's Inc., 629 F.
Supp. 1403 (D. N.M. 1986); Frichterv. National Life & Accident Insurance Co.,
620 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1985); Hostettler v. PioneerHi-Bred International,
Inc. 624 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d
1379 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781
(Conn. 1984); Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home, 380 N.W.2d 544
(Minn. App. 1986). Id.
31. Metcalf, 778 P.2d at 748.
32. 876 P.2d 1278 (Haw. 1994).
33. Id. at 1286 (citing Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d
110, 115 (Haw. 1986)).
34. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
35. Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318
(Ill. 1987). The basic requisites of contract formation are, of course, offer,
acceptance, and consideration. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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employee's continued employment will constitute consideration
when these conditions are present. 38
When the employee
handbook creates an enforceable contract, it modifies the at-will
nature of his employment.39 Additionally, for a handbook to create
an enforceable implied employment contract, the provisions in the
handbook must be specific, and the employee must be induced to
remain on the job and not "actively seek other employment."'0
Clear and unambiguous disclaimers of contractual intent may
be effective in preventing an implied contract.4'
However,
unilateral modification of the handbook to include such
contractual disclaimers that diminish employee benefits or lack
consideration between the parties may not be enforceable against
existing employees. 2
In states that do not recognize an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context, courts turn to
other sources of the law to find a remedy for wrongful termination.
B. The Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
The tort of retaliatory discharge is generally a limited and
narrow exception to the general rule of at-will employment. 4' To
establish a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he was discharged in retaliation for his
activities, and that the discharge contravenes a clearly mandated
public policy."
1.

Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine Based Upon Public Policy

Public policy has been defined as a "principle of law which
holds that no one can lawfully do that which tends to be injurious
to the public or against the public good."45 An exception to the atwill doctrine must further a "policy affecting the public interest,
which must be fundamental or substantial when the company
discharges an employee."" Violations of internal practices that

38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984).
41. See Hart v. Seven Resorts, Inc., 947 P.2d 846, 852 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that an at-will employment was not modified where a personnel
manual stated that employees were terminable at-will and employees signed a
form was signed indicating their understanding that employment was
terminable at-will).
42. Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (Il. 1999).
43. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991) (citing Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 353 (Ill. 1978)).
44. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ill. 1985).
45. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959)).
46. Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Cal. 1998) (citing Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 n.11 (Cal. 1988)).
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affect only the interests of employers or employees, and not the
general public, generally will not give rise to tort damages.

Public policy exceptions to the general rule of at-will
employment have been recognized for an employee who has been
discharged for the following acts or omissions: (1) "refus[ing] to
perform an illegal act,"' (2) reporting an alleged violation of law or
public policy by his employer or fellow employees, also known as
"whistle blowing,"49 (3) exercising a statutory right or privilege
(4) filing
that "sound public policy would encourage," 5° and
workers' compensation claims.5 Generally, the courts find public
policy in either the state constitutions 52 or statutory provisions" to
Some courts have
rationalize a retaliatory discharge claim.
adopted a broader view of the public policy exception to include
administrative regulations" and prior judicial decisions.' A few
jurisdictions have recognized that sound and specific public policy
may be found in professional codes of ethics.'
2.

Statutes Relating to Wrongful Discharge
States that have enacted statutes relating to wrongful

47. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988).
48. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980)
(holding that "an employer's authority over its employee does not include the
right to demand that the employee commit a criminal act to further its
interests"); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d
25, 27-28 (Cal. 1959) (holding that it was wrongful to fire an employee who
refused to commit perjury); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,
735 (Tex. 1985) (holding that an exception to the employment at-will doctrine
exists "for an employee who is discharged for the sole reason that the
employee refused to perform an illegal act").
49. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Il.
1981).
50. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 875-76. These rights or privileges would include
accepting jury duty, "seeking public office, asserting a right to elect...
collective bargaining representatives, or joining a labor union." Id. at 875.
51. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978). See also Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) (holding that an
application of state law is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act only if the application necessitates the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement).
52. Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871 (citing In re Rahn's Estate, 291 S.W. 120, 123
(Mo. 1927)).
53. Id. (citing Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 625 (Haw.
1982)).
54. Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Cal. 1998).
55. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033-34 (Ariz.
1985).
56. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv., 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996);
Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1026 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980). See discussion
infra Part III.D. for jurisdictions recognizing sound public policy in
professional codes of ethics.

20001

To Do, or Not to Do, the "Right Thing"

discharge provide the employee with statutory protection for
violations covered under the law. Public policy may be codified in a
statute. 57 For example, although "whistle-blowing" is recognized
as a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine of employment,
the enactment of "whistle-blower" statutes also gives an employee
statutory protection for disclosing his employer's or co-worker's
illegal misconduct."
Federal employees have the protection of a
federal whistle-blower statute. 59 However, state whistle-blower
laws may apply only to employees of a "public body."'
Oftentimes, the protection of a whistle-blower will depend on
whether the employee reported the violation to a federal or state
agency rather than to the employer.
For example, merely
complaining within the workplace that workers were exposed to
toxic chemicals without adequate ventilation may be considered a
private interest not warranting protection."' In a similar situation,
good faith reporting of computer-assisted fraud to company
management may not be considered a "clear and substantial public
policy."'2
Wrongful discharge statutes extend protection to employees
beyond that of a "whistle-blower."'
These statutes benefit the
employee by eliminating common law defenses, thereby imposing a
"good cause" discharge requirement on the employer."
If the
discharge is considered "wrongful," most courts classify the
employer's action as tortious and award damages accordingly.
Tort damages may include lost wages and other employee
benefits.' Punitive damages may be allowed in cases involving

57. See Kobus, supra note 4, at 1345-47 for further discussion.
58. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089 (Michie 1999). See Reed v.

Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Alaska 1989) (holding that
the Alaskan statute does not preclude an employee from instituting an action
under tort or contract theory). Cf. List v. Anchor Paint Mfg. Co., 910 P.2d
1011, 1015 (Okla. 1996) (holding that the statutory cause of action for
wrongful discharge is the employee's exclusive remedy and the employee may
not sue for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (1999).
60. Holewinski v. Children's Hosp., 649 A.2d 712, 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
61. McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 696 A.2d 173, 177-78
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
62. Fox v. MCI Comm. Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997).
63. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838, (1983)
(citing WIs. STAT. §§ 756.25(1), 45.50, 812.235, 111.37(4) (1983)). Under
Wisconsin statute, an employer may not discharge at-will employees for
absences due to jury service, military service, or for refusal to submit to
honesty-testing or a garnishment of wages. Id.
64. Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 506 (Mont. 1989). Good
cause is defined here as "reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on
failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's
operation, or other legitimate business reasons." Id.
65. Id. at 504.
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outrageous conduct.6
Exceptions to at-will employment are based upon clearly
mandated public policy. Definite statements of public policy may
be found within the attorneys' professional code of ethics.

II. THE ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF ATTORNEYS
In a civilized life, law floats in a sea of ethics. Each is
indispensable to civilization. Without law, we should be at
the mercy of the least scrupulous; without ethics, law could
67
not exist.
A licensed attorney has professional responsibilities dictated
to him by his state's supreme court. These responsibilities are
usually patterned after the American Bar Association's Model
Code of Professional Responsibility6 or the Model Rules of
Section A discusses
Professional Conduct (Model Rules).6 9
pertinent portions of the Model Rules0 regarding confidentiality
and the attorney-client relationship.
Section B explains the
substantial differences of the attorney-client relationship between
employment of in-house attorneys and private law firm attorneys.
A. The ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct seek to safeguard the attorney-client privilege and other
confidential information by restricting a lawyer's ability to disclose
communications made in confidence between the lawyer and the
client.
1.

The Duty of Confidentiality
The ABA Model Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information,

states:

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
66. Id.; Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Ill.

1981).
67. Fred J. Cook, The Corrupt Society, THE NATION, 1-8 June 1963, at 453
(quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren).
68. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1996).
69. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1996). See also
Anthony J. Blackwell, Weider's Paradox:Reporting Legal Misconduct in Law

Firms, 1992/1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 9, 22-26 (1993) (providing a history of the
duty to report attorney misconduct).
70. The discussion in this Article is limited to the ABA MODEL RULES.
While many states pattern their rules of conduct after the ABA MODEL RULES,

rules of professional conduct vary from state to state. See Blackwell, supra
note 69, at 24-26 and accompanying footnotes (listing those states adhering to
the MODEL CODE and those states adopting the MODEL RULES).
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representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.71
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is to enhance the
effectiveness of legal advice by "encourag[ing] full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients... ."2
"The
principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of
law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product
doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality
established in professional ethics."73 This duty of confidentiality
applies in every context where the attorney-client privilege does
not apply.74
The lawyer's duty of confidentiality covers all
information relating to the representation of a client, regardless of
its source. 1 The exceptions to the duty of confidentiality noted in
Model Rule 1.6(b) allow an attorney to disclose information that is
necessary only "to establish a claim or defense on behalf76 of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client."
Many of the Model Rules serve as a type of self-regulation for
practicing attorneys.
2.

Self-regulationof the Legal Profession

ABA Model Rule 8.3, Reporting Professional Misconduct,
creates the attorney's obligation to report misconduct of another
attorney. It states, in part:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a

71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996).

72. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1996).
74. Id.
75. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380
(1994).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1996). See also
Sheehan, supra note 4, at 865 (maintaining that the attorney-client
relationship is not harmed by a retaliatory discharge action for in-house
counsel because the codes of professional conduct provide exceptions for
criminal and fraudulent conduct).
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violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform that appropriate
professional authority.

(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6 or information gained by a lawyer or judge
while serving as a member of an approved lawyers assistance
program to the extent that such information would be confidential if
it were communicated subject to the attorney-client privilege."

Thus, a lawyer has a duty to report another lawyer's
misconduct.7 '
For example, a lawyer may be disbarred for
participating in the unethical conduct of his firm and failing to
report the conduct.7"
And, an attorney's failure to report
misconduct of his client's former attorney who converted the
client's settlement funds, may warrant a one-year suspension.'
However, Model Rule 8.3(b) expressly exempts confidential

information from the reporting requirement, under Model Rule
1.6. The duty of confidentiality may prohibit an attorney from
reporting the misconduct of another attorney without the client's
consent when confidential information would be disclosed.81 This
duty of confidentiality supersedes the duty to report misconduct. 2
Obviously, this raises concern over the effectiveness of the legal
profession's self-regulation.'
A lawyer's first duty is to both the court and the proper
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a)&(c) (1996).
78. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 846 (1st Cir. 1984).
79. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kahn, 431 A.2d 1336, 1352 (Md. 1981).
80. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ill. 1988).
81. In re Ethics Advisory Panel Op. No. 921, 627 A.2d 317, 323 (R.I. 1993).
See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Profl Guidance Comm., Op. 93-28 (1994) (stating
that when a client instructs a lawyer not to report a former lawyer who
converted estate funds for personal use, the requirement of confidentiality
supersedes the obligation to report this misconduct); Oregon State Bar Ass'n,
Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 1991-95 (1991) (stating that a lawyer may not
report misconduct of the client's former lawyer if it would disclose the client's
confidence, unless the client consents); Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profl
Ethics, Informal Op. 89-14 (1989) (noting that an in-house lawyer who learns
that company attorneys entered into an illegal payment agreement with an
informant may not report the misconduct because such disclosure would
implicate the company). But see Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profl
Ethics, Informal Op. 95-17 (1995) (stating that falsifying a complaint to avoid
having the suit barred by the statute of limitations must be reported promptly
and confidentiality will not be used as a shield against disclosure of that
information).
82. Ethics Advisory Panel Op., 627 A.2d at 323.
83. Because of the concern for effective self-regulation of the legal system,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island requested a further study on possible
amendments to the confidentiality rule. Id.
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administration of justice." Model Rule 3.3(a), Candor Toward the
Tribunal, states, in part, "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make
a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; [or] (2) fail
to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the
client."'
The court may suspend an attorney for altering or
falsifying documents submitted to the court. 8 Moreover, courts
may consider the American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions87 in deciding the fate of an attorney
subject to discipline.
3. The Attorney-Client Relationship
The ethical duty of confidentiality prohibits an attorney from
revealing information relating to his representation of a client.'
Similarly, the attorney-client privilege prevents a court from using
its powers of subpoena and contempt to force an attorney to
disclose confidential communications between him and his client.89
Because an attorney may invoke this attorney-client privilege, the
attorney does not threaten client confidentiality when suing the
attorney-employer for retaliatory discharge.
4. The PrivateLaw Firm Attorney and the In-House Attorney
The attorney-client status is not involved when a private law
firm discharges one of its attorney-employees. A client may
discharge a lawyer with or without cause.' A "client" means a
person or entity that "employs or retains an attorney ... to appear

for him in courts, advise, assist, and defend him in legal
proceedings, and to act for him in any legal business."91 When the
client is a corporation, the attorney-client privilege includes
communications between the lawyer and high-ranking corporate
officials.'
When a corporation employs in-house counsel, the
corporation is not only the attorney's employer; the corporation is
also the attorney's client. Because of the relationship between
corporate counsel and the client, who is also the employer, breach
of the duty of confidentiality may be a concern in retaliatory
discharge claims by former corporate and in-house attorneys.
84. State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 701 (Fla. 1995).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) & (2) (1996).
86. In re Reciprocal Discipline of Page, 955 P.2d 239, 243-44 (Or. 1998).

87. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1992).
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1996).

89. Id.
90. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1397
(1977) (stating that "no lawyer can continue to represent a client who does not
wish to be represented").
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 254 (6th ed. 1990).
92. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).

93. This Article focuses primarily on private attorneys and their wrongful
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However,, the employer-law firm is not the attorneyemployee's "client."
Accordingly, there is no threat to
confidentiality and no compromise of the attorney-client
relationship when an attorney-employee who is wrongfully
discharged by the employer-law firm brings an action. If there is a
need to set forth confidential information (such as the identity of
the law firm's client) in establishing the attorney-employee's claim
or in defending the allegations against the attorney-employer,
protective measures are readily available. To protect disclosure of
client confidences, courts may utilize "sealing and protective
orders, limited admissibility of evidence, orders restricting the use
of testimony in successive proceedings ... and, in camera
proceedings.""
The integrity of the attorney-client privilege
remains intact and the public interest in punishing fraudulent
behavior of employers may be vindicated.
Attorneys who have lost their jobs for upholding the sanctity
of their profession in their refusal to violate their ethics have
sought remedies for wrongful termination against their employers.

III. ATTORNEYS AND THEIR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE ACTIONS
Attorneys may be unpopular, but they are not yet fairgame.95
Attorneys, like other employees, may be the subjects of
wrongful termination. The nature of the legal profession places
emphasis on the attorney-client relationship and the duty of
confidentiality. Courts are concerned that allowing attorneys'
claims for retaliatory discharge against their employers will result
in a breach of legal ethics. Ironically, it is often the attorney's
adherence to the professional code of ethics that results in his
wrongful discharge. 9 Section A examines the attorney-client
discharge claims against attorney-employers.

See generally Stephen C.

Dillard, When Principles Clash: The In-House Counsel as Renegade or

Whistleblower, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 206 (1996); Robert Fitzpatrick, The Duty of
Confidentiality: When May an Attorney Suing His/Her Former Employer
Divulge Client Confidences Obtained During the Course of His/Her

Employment?, SC08 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 167 (1997) (discussing the duty of
confidentiality and the in-house attorney employment dilemma); Todd Myers,
The In-House Attorney Employment Dilemma, 6-WTR KAN.

J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

147 (1997).
94. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal.
1994). See Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that rescission of a seal order involving information that was subject to an

attorney-client privilege was abuse of discretion).
95. Golightly-Howell v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Intl Union, 806 F.
Supp. 921, 924 (D. Colo. 1992). This statement was made by District Judge
Carrigan in his conclusion that the plaintiffs "status as an attorney cannot
excuse an employer's violation of its contractual... obligation." Id.
96. See Blackwell, supra note 69, at 11 (discussing the "ethical paradox"

that requires attorneys to report professional misconduct at the risk of being
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relationship and attorneys' claims under wrongful discharge
theories. Section B reviews wrongful discharge actions based in
contract. Section C discusses lawsuits based in tort. Section D
considers cases in which courts recognize professional code of
ethics as sources for the public policy exception to at-will
employment.
A. The Attorney-Client Relationship and Wrongful Discharge
Claims
There is concern that allowing attorneys to sue their
employers will have a "chilling effect" on the attorney-client
relationship.97 Additionally, there are a few cases where the mere
fact that the plaintiff is an attorney will prevent any recovery
whatsoever for wrongful discharge.
In Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health
Insurance,' the court denied an in-house attorney a remedy for
wrongful discharge. Herbster was chief legal counsel for North
American Co.
When Herbster refused to destroy requested
discovery information that would support allegations of fraud in a
lawsuit pending against the company, North American fired him."
Herbster argued that his relationship with North American was
more permanent than an attorney-client relationship, because he
looked to North American for job security and compensation."
The court refused to separate Herbster's role as an employee from
his profession as an attorney. 10' The court denied extension of the
tort of retaliatory discharge to attorneys because the "mutual
trust, exchanges of confidence ... and [the] personal nature of the
attorney-client relationship" would suffer serious impact."
Five years later, in his dissent in Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,103
Justice Freeman contended that the majority in Herbster ignored
the fact that North American decided to proceed with illegal
conduct, contrary to attorney Herbster's advice."°
Justice
Freeman further noted that "[i]t is that conduct, not the attorney's
ethical obligations, which is the predicate of the retaliatory
discharge claim."'05
Balla also held that a former in-house attorney did not have a
cause of action against his employer for retaliatory discharge."°
fired from their firms).
97. BaUa v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ill. 1991).
98. 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
99. Id. at 344.
100. Id. at 346.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 348.
103. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 115.
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id. at 104.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[33:383

Gambro was a distributor of kidney dialysis equipment. 7 When
Balla became aware that a shipment of certain dialyzers was
defective and could cause an acute health risk if used, he told
Gambro's president to reject the shipment."° Without Balla's
knowledge, Gambro accepted the shipment and intended to sell
the equipment. When Balla found out about the sale, he told
Gambro's President that he would do whatever was necessary to
stop the sale of the equipment.'" Balla was subsequently fired." °
Balla reported the shipment of the dialyzers to the Federal Drug
Administration, which then seized the product and rendered the
dialyzers adulterated."' The Balla court felt that public policy was
"adequately safeguarded without extending the tort of retaliatory
discharge to in-house counsel."" 2 The court disagreed with Balla's
assertion that, without the remedy of retaliatory discharge, inhouse attorneys would be faced with a "Hobson's choice" of either
complying with the client-employer's wishes, thereby risking the
loss of one's professional license or being subject to criminal
sanctions, or in the alternative, refusing to comply with the clientemployer's wishes, thereby risking the loss of one's livelihood."'
The court, instead, simply stated that as an attorney, Balla had no
choice but to report the defective dialyzers to the FDA and had a
duty to withdraw from continued representation of Gambro."M
The court in General Dynamics v. Superior Court felt that
referring to the duty of withdrawal as a "remedy" was illusory."'
The dissenting Justice in Balla felt that it was naive." 6 The
courts, as well as most attorneys, want to believe that attorneys
will always "do the right thing." 117 However, when attorneys are
faced with the possibility of losing their livelihood and means of
feeding their families, the temptation will be present to ignore or
rationalize away ethical obligations."" Justice Freeman stated
that to allow a corporate employer to go forward with illegal
conduct contrary to the advice of its in-house counsel and then to
fire that same in-house counsel without fear of sanctions is "truly
to give ... assistance and protection of the courts to scoundrels.""9
A corporate employer should not be protected simply because the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 105.
Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 108.
Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
Id.
876 P.2d 487, 502 (Ca. 1994).
Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 114.
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employee it has fired for "blowing the whistle" happens to be an
attorney.' ° Additionally, the Illinois Bar Association did not
receive the Balla decision well. The governors of this Association
voted to file a brief to urge the Illinois Supreme Court to reverse
the decision. 2'
Unfortunately, in Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C.,"' the
Supreme Court of Illinois followed its reasoning in Balla and held
that an attorney employed by a law firm may not maintain a cause
of action against his employer for retaliatory discharge."
Overruling the Appellate Court for the First District, the court
again reiterated its position that an attorney's ethical obligations
contain sufficient safeguards to protect public policy and found it
unnecessary to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to the
employee-attorney. 2
Justice Freeman, again dissenting, noted
that attorneys "[have] been stripped of a remedy which Illinois
clearly affords to all other employees in such 'whistle-blowing'
situations."'
While the majority of jurisdictions allow an attorney to bring
a wrongful discharge claim against his employer, those courts
require that the discharge violate a specific expression of public
policy. In McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp.,12 the court reversed
a jury verdict in favor of a general counsel for his wrongful
discharge action. 2 ' McGonagle, a former general counsel to an
insurance company, refused to approve insurance mailings which
violated insurance laws in several states."
McGonagle alleged
that his subsequent termination violated a compelling mandate of
public policy.'
However, the court found that there was no
violation based upon public policy because the insurance laws
were general expressions of the state's monitoring of the insurance
industry."' The court felt bound by Pennsylvania law and stated
that "unless an employee identifies a 'specific' expression of public
policy violated by his discharge, it will 31not be labeled as wrongful
and within the sphere of public policy."
There is, of course, concern that client confidences will be
revealed if a wrongful discharge action is maintained. In Eckhaus
120. Id.
121. Patricia Manson, Let Fired Counsel Sue, ISBA to Urge, CHI. DAILY L.

BULL., Sept. 14, 1998, at 1.
122. 706 N.E.2d 491 (IMI.1998) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 494.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 556 A.2d 878, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. at 881.
130. Id. at 885.
131. McGonagle, 556 A.2d

at 885.
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v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., the court held that a former general counsel
could not maintain a defamation action against a corporation,
since the action would result in revealing client confidences and
secrets."u Eckhaus had an employment contract with Alfa-Laval
that provided for termination for cause."3 The defamation claim
involved an evaluation memorandum containing allegations of
professional incompetence that Eckhaus claimed was published in
reckless disregard for the truth."
The court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment because further
prosecution of the defamation action would require Eckhaus to
reveal "further facts constituting client confidences and secrets. " "'
This disclosure, the court maintained, would violate the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits an attorney
from disclosing information gained
in the professional relationship
137
between a client and an attorney.

However, most courts have outrightly rejected the notion that
a plaintiffs status as an attorney should bar recovery.
In
Golightly-Howell v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union,1u the court concluded that an employee's status as an inhouse attorney did not excuse an employer's violation of its
contractual obligation; the court refused to conclude that the
attorney-client relationship would bar a former in-house counsel's
claim for breach of contract. 39 The court in Nordling v. Northern
States Power Co." ° also held that the attorney-client relationship
does not preclude in-house attorneys from bringing wrongful
discharge claims against a corporate employer."" Additionally, an
individual's status as an attorney should not prevent him from
seeking damages
from an employer for violations of the attorney's
142
civil rights.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

764 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 35 n.1.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.

137. Eckhaus, 764 F. Supp. at 38.
138. 806 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D. Colo. 1992).

139. Id. at 924.
140. 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).

See infra notes 152-57, 193-96 and

accompanying text for further discussion of the Nordling case.
141. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502.
142. See Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 182 (3d Cir.
1985) (allowing sex discrimination claim to be maintained by an in-house
counsel against her employer); but see Holland v. Board of County Comm'r,
883 P.2d 500, 509 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a retaliatory discharge
claim by a former county attorney was barred by the Governmental Immunity
Act); Giaimo & Vreeburg v. Smith, 599 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding that a white lawyer had no civil rights claims when discharged by a
black client who wanted a black attorney).
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B. Wrongful TerminationBased on Contract
Attorneys have brought wrongful discharge claims under
contract theories. In Wieder v. Skala," a law firm fired an
associate for insisting that the law firm report the misconduct of
one of its lawyers. The court allowed the associate's wrongful
discharge lawsuit against his former partners under a breach of
contract theory.'"
Employee handbooks may create enforceable contractual
rights if the traditional requirements for contract foundation are
present.'45 Courts have allowed attorneys to maintain lawsuits
against their employers for breach of contract based upon
employee handbooks. In Golightly-Howell,1' the court recognized
a former in-house attorney's breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claim against her employer. 147 The court
found that Ms. Golightly-Howell's employment contract was
subject to a "just cause" contract based upon the employee
manual.'"
Similarly, in Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance Ass'n, 4'
the court allowed an attorney employed by an insurance company
to maintain his lawsuit against his employer, based upon a breach
of a "just cause" contract in the employer's policy manual and
pamphlets." ° The jury's finding that the employer discharged
Mourad in retaliation for his failure to violate his code of
professional ethics was a sufficient basis for a breach of a justcause contract. 5'
In Nordling,5 s the court also allowed a former in-house
attorney's claim based upon an action for breach of a contractual
provision in an employee handbook."
Northern States
maintained a handbook that provided steps for "Positive
Discipline" in the discharging employees.TM Northern States fired
Nordling without warning and without following the steps dictated
in the handbook."
Nordling contended that the company fired
him because he objected to a proposed investigation of the

143. 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992).
144. Id. at 110. See Blackwell, supra note 69, at 18 (questioning the court of
appeal's refusal to recognize a broader theory of protection for reporting

attorneys).
145. Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 110.
146. 806 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1992).

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 924.
Id. at 925.
465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 402.
Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.
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personal lifestyles of Northern States' employees, which Nordling
said had the "connotation of conducting illegal activities."15 The
court saw "no reason to deny the job security aspects of the
employer-employee relationship if this can be done " without
157
violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship.
However,
in Michaelson v.
Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co.," the court held that an employee handbook
did not modify an in-house counsel's at-will employment, since
Minnesota courts do not read an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into employment contracts.'59
Recovery under a contract theory does not yield satisfactory
damages for an attorney who moves his family, buys a new home,
and places his children in a new school, only to be suddenly fired
for upholding the ethics he assumed were sacred to the legal
profession. Limiting the attorney-employee's remedy for wrongful
discharge to a contract theory does nothing to encourage the
reporting of unethical and illegal behavior. Extending protection
to attorney-whistle-blowers in a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge is one way to provide an incentive for attorneys to
comply with their ethical obligations and do the "right thing."
C. The Attorney and the Tort of RetaliatoryDischarge
While a retaliatory discharge claim may implicate the
attorney-client relationship and raise issues of confidentiality and
client wrongdoing, courts have recognized the need to provide a
remedy for attorneys fired in retaliation for confronting their
employer's unethical conduct."6 For instance, courts generally
recognize the tort of retaliatory discharge for employee-attorneys if
the claim relates to explicit statutory or ethical norms that are of
public importance, and if the attorney can prove the claim without6
violation of his obligation to respect client confidences. 1
Additionally, to sustain a claim, an attorney must prove that his
employer6 2 fired or constructively discharged him from his
position.

156. Id.

157.
158.
159.
160.

Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502.
474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. App. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 181.
See supra Part III.A. for further discussion.

161. GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 166-67 (Mass. 1995).
162. Id. at 168. See Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877,

882 (Ill. 1995) (holding there is no cause of action predicated on retaliatory
demotion); White v. Washington, 929 P.2d 396, 408 (Wash. 1996) (refusing to
recognize the tort of wrongful transfer). But see Brigham v. Dillon Co., 935
P.2d 1054, 1059-60 (Kan. 1997) (holding that a cause of action for "retaliatory
demotion is a necessary and logical extension of the cause of action for
retaliatory discharge").
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In General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court,'6 3 the California
Supreme Court recognized the attorney's dilemma of adhering to
the Rules of Professional Conduct while surrendering to the
General Dynamics abruptly
employer's illegitimate demands."
fired Andrew Rose, who was under consideration for general
counsel, after Rose had worked there for fourteen years. 5 General
Dynamics stated that the company's reason for the firing was its
loss of confidence in Rose's legal ability.'6 6 Rose filed a complaint
under breach of implied contract and public policy tort claims.
Rose alleged that the real reasons for his termination included his
investigation into company officials' widespread drug use and their
cover-up, his protest of General Dynamics' refusal to investigate
the office "bugging" of the company's chief of security, and his
warnings to General Dynamics of its violation of the federal Fair
Courts "do not require nonlawyer
Labor Standards Act.'67
employees to quietly surrender their jobs rather than 'go along'
Although Rose's
with an employer's unlawful demands." 65
complaint failed to state that the rules of professional
responsibility supported the conduct leading to his termination,
the court stated that it would allow a retaliatory discharge remedy
where the employer made illegitimate demands and the attorney
insisted on following his clear ethical duties under the Rules of
Professional Conduct.'69
Similarly, in GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart,' the court held
that an in-house counsel may maintain a wrongful discharge
action for refusing to violate ethical norms, provided the attorney
can prove his claim without violating his obligation to respect
client confidences."' Stewart was an employee of GTE for over
eleven years and resigned when he felt he would "have to abandon
unpopular but legally sound positions" regarding his stand on
consumer safety.'72 However, because Stewart failed to establish
that he was constructively discharged,' the employer's summary
judgment was affirmed."74
In Willy v. Coastal States Management Co., 75 the court held
that an attorney's status as in-house counsel does not preclude the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id. at 490-91.
General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502.
Id. at 501.
653 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1995).
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
939 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
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attorney from maintaining a claim for retaliatory discharge,
provided that he could prove the claim without violation of his
obligation to protect a client's confidences.'76 Additionally, the
Rules of Professional Conduct, imposing a duty of confidentiality,
did not preclude an in-house counsel from bringing a retaliatory
discharge claim against her former employer, said the court in
Kachmar v. SunGardData Systems, Inc.177
In Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc.,78 the defendant fired an
attorney for refusing to copy documents containing a competitor's
trade secrets; the court concluded that Parker was entitled to
monetary damages for the employer's retaliatory discharge.179 The
court stated that public policy in favor of whistle-blowing on illegal
conduct overrides an attorney's duties of confidentiality."8
Also, in Klages v. Sperry Corp.,"' the court upheld a wrongful
discharge action by an in-house counsel fired for investigating real
estate commissions that the employer paid to the company
president's wife. The court found that Klages' allegation of his
employer's specific intent '82 to harm or coerce him to break a law or
compromise himself withstood dismissal of a wrongful discharge
claim under Pennsylvania law."
The court noted that Klages'
discharge interfered with his interest in properly performing his
duties as an attorney under the mandates of his code of
professional ethics.'8 Klages furthered the public social interests
of disclosing security law violations, which outweighed the
employer's power to discharge for the express purpose of harming
the employee."
In Mourad v. Automobile Club Insurance Ass'n, s' Mourad, an
attorney employed by an insurance company, claimed that the
company demoted him for refusing to comply with unethical and
illegal orders from his non-attorney supervisor. 8 7 The court noted
that the plaintiff, as supervisor over lawsuits involving
catastrophic injury, was an attorney for the insureds. "The fact
remains that an insurance defense attorney represents the insured
176. Id. at 200.
177. 109 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 1997).
178. 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).

179. Id. at 220.
180. Id. at 221-22.
181. 1984 WL 49135, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
182. But see Krajsa v. Keypunch, 622 A.2d 355, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(rejecting the specific intent to harm theory for wrongful discharge and
holding that only exception to at-will actions is where the discharge violates
clear mandates of public policy).
183. Klages, 1984 WL 49135, at *7 (citing Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422
A.2d 611, 618 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).
184. Id. at *8.
185. Id.
186. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).

187. Id.
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and not the insurance company."'8 The court went on to say that
the "fact that an insurance company may directly pay the attorney
fee rather than merely reimbursing its insured does not affect the
nature of the attorney-client relationship nor does it change the
fact that the attorney represents the insured client and only owes
a duty to that insured client."8 9 The court noted that the
defendant should have known that Mourad was bound by a code of
professional conduct, and that the defendants were bound by a
code when contracting not to terminate Mourad without good
cause.190 The court, however, disallowed Mourad's retaliatory
discharge claim because it was duplicative of, and inconsistent
with, a holding for a breach of contract.'
While the Nordling court allowed a former in-house attorney's
claim based upon contract," 2 the court held that the attorneyclient relationship does not preclude an attorney from bringing a
retaliatory discharge claim." 3 However, the court found that
Nordling failed to establish his claim, based on Minnesota's
whistle-blower statute. 19 The statute provides that an employer
shall not discharge an employee who, "in good faith, reports a
violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law" to an
employer or official.'9' Based upon the fact that Northern States
promptly discarded the employee surveillance plan in question
after its officers outside the legal department discovered the plan,
and because the court was unable to determine what kind of
surveillance was even considered, the court dismissed the
attorney's retaliatory claim."9
While courts have afforded the claim of retaliatory discharge
to attorneys wrongfully terminated, at the same time, they find
public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.
D. ProfessionalCodes of Ethics and the Wrongful Discharge Suit
Several courts have found professional ethics codes as viable
sources of the public policy exception to at-will employment.
Pierce v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.'97 is one of the leading
cases recognizing that a professional code of ethics may identify a
188. Id. at 400 (citing Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 448 N.W.2d 804, 804
(Mich. App. Ct. 1989)).

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Mourad,465 N.W.2d at 400. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the plaintiffs breach of contract claim.
192. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.

193.
1991).
194.
195.
196.
197.

Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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specific expression of public policy. Grace Pierce was a physician
and an at-will employee of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp."9 She
refused to continue a research project for development of a drug
named loperamide. Her objection in continuing was over the use
of saccharin in the formula. 9' Pierce claimed that continuing the
project would violate her Hippocratic oath as a physician.'
Pierce's employer removed her from the project and subsequently
Pierce resigned because she felt she was being demoted.20 ' Pierce
filed a wrongful discharge action.
The court stated that
professional codes of ethics might contain an expression of public
policy.2 2 An employee who is fired for refusing to perform an act
that would violate these ethics may bring a wrongful discharge
action against the employer.2 3 While the majority found that the
Hippocratic oath did not contain a clear mandate of public policy
that prevented Dr. Pierce from continuing her research, 20 ' the
dissent concluded that there are a number of recognized codes of
medical ethics that provide a "clear mandate of public policy." 29"
Therefore, Dr. Pierce was entitled to "claim the protection of one or
more of these recognized codes of professional ethics."2°
Additionally, courts have held that rules of professional
conduct for accountants constitute sufficient public purpose for
wrongful discharge claims.2 7 In Rocky Mountain Hospital &
Medical Service v. Mariani,the Supreme Court of Colorado, sitting
en banc, stated that the "integrity and objectivity" provision of the
accountants' professional rules was a "sufficiently clear mandate of
public policy."2' Diana Mariani was an at-will employee and a
licensed certified public accountant for Colorado Blue Cross Blue
Shield (BCBS).2 9 Mariani discovered some irregular accounting
practices in BCBS's records and complained to her supervisor. °
When BCBS fired Mariani, she filed suit against BCBS and her
supervisor." ' One of her claims was for retaliatory discharge in
198. Id. at 506.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 507.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Pierce,417 A.2d at 512.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 518.

207. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 528

(Colo. 1996).
208. Id. at 526.
209. Id. at 521.
210. Id. at 521-22. The irregular accounting practices included omission of
expenses on IRS reports, failure to list a large surplus note on a financial
statement, misrepresentation of the financial status of Rock Mountain Life,
and mischaracterization of the benefits of a merger. Id.
211. Id. at 522.
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violation of public policy."' In refusing to limit the sources of
public policy for a wrongful discharge claim to constitutional or

statutory provisions, the court held that professional ethics codes

may be a source of public policy." 3 The court noted that the
Colorado State Board of Accountancy Rules of Professional
Conduct govern practicing certified public accountants and provide
for state Board professional discipline for failure to abide by its
rules. 4 The rules of professional conduct for accountants ensure
the accurate reporting of financial information to the public and
allow the public and businesses to rely upon this information. 5
The legislature endorsed this important public purpose in
Colorado's statutes."'
The accountancy rules provide clear
direction to an accountant as to the scope of duty, and clear notice
to an employer that accountants have a duty to report financial
information fairly and accurately. 7 Because the rules are clear
and of public importance, the court held that the rules represent a
"clear mandate of public policy."1 8 The court found that Mariani
established a prima facie case of wrongful discharge for refusing to
falsify accounting information based upon her professional rules of
conduct."'
In Kalman v. Grand Union Co.,=° the court held that the Code
of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Association represented
a clear mandate of public policy."l Kalman was a pharmacist for
the defendant's pharmacy located in its grocery store.2 2 New
Jersey statute required a registered pharmacist to be on duty
whenever the store was open.'
When Kalman's supervisor told
him that the pharmacy would be closed although the store was to
remain open on July 4, Kalman informed the supervisor that state
regulations required the pharmacy to remain open and that his
own license could be revoked for violating the regulation.'
The
supervisor told Kalman that "no one would know."2' As a result of
Kalman's phone call to the State Board of Pharmacy, the
pharmacy was required to stay open on July 4 and 5, and Kalman

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Rocky Mountain Hosp., 916 P.2d at 522.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id.

217. Rocky Mountain Hosp., 916 P.2d at 526.

218. Id.
219. Id. at 528.
220. 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982).

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 730-31.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 729.
Kalman, 443 A.2d at 729.
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was fired. 26 Kalman filed a wrongful discharge action, contending
that the company fired him for attempting to follow a state
regulation and his own code of professional ethics." 7 The court
concluded that Kalman's discharge was contrary to public policy as
evidenced by his professional code of ethics and reversed the
defendant's grant for summary judgment.'
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility express
clear and specific public policy. An attorney-employer should not
go unpunished for criminal or fraudulent behavior and the Model
The
Rules entrust the attorney to report this type of conduct.'
Model Rules provide specific guidance to the attorney-employer;
each and every attorney-employer is quite aware of these rules.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY BY PROFESSIONAL CODE EXCEPTION AND
ATTORNEY-EMPLOYEES IN PRIVATE PRACTICE

Existing rules and principles can give us ourpresent location,
our bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that
shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like
the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a
principle of growth.2°

Private law firm attorneys wrongfully discharged for refusing
to violate their professional code of ethics should be allowed a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Courts should recognize
a "public policy by professional code exception" to the at-will
employment of an attorney-employee inprivate practice.
A claim of retaliatory discharge by an attorney-employee fired
by a private law firm would not violate the attorney's obligation to
respect client confidences because this claim may be established
without breaching ethical obligations to a former employer. There
would be no chill of the attorney-client relationship. The threat of
confidentiality breach is not present in the relationship between
the attorney-employer and the attorney-employee in private
practice because the private law firm employer is not the attorneyemployee's client. Just as the employee's status as an attorney
should not bar the employee from a remedy for wrongful
discharge, the status of an employer as an attorney is no reason to
provide that individual with immunity from a wrongful
termination claim.
One of the reasons for the tort of retaliatory discharge was
the recognition that workers do not "stand on equal footing" with
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 731.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a)&(c) (1996).
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19-20 (1924).
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employers. 1 This is true with attorneys. An attorney does not
enjoy a "mutuality of choice. " =2 An attorney may not be mobile
because of the sheer number of licensed attorneys. Moreover, an
attorney's marketability may be damaged when the employer
wrongfully discharges him from employment. Cases like Herbster
may invite employers to state that a discharged attorney was fired
These factors would
for "unsatisfactory job performance."'
seriously impair an attorney's search for new employment. An
attorney-employee should be able to enjoy the protections afforded
to a non-attorney employee in the area of wrongful discharge.
The Code of Ethics provides a definite statement of public
policy. The Model Rules of ethics "define the minimal standards
applicable to lawyers, and these standards are in turn linked to
important values affecting the public interest."'m All attorneys
must adhere to the regulations set forth in their code of ethics.
When an employer is also an attorney, the employer is expected to
know the fundamental public policies expressed in those
regulations. The policy behind the Model Rules affects society at
large-the Model Rules are not mere internal regulations of the
profession.
The Model Rules do not afford sufficient safeguards to protect
the public interest. To deny an attorney-employee of a private law
firm a remedy for adhering to his professional ethics does not
encourage respect for the law. It weeds out the honest attorneys.
However, allowing such a remedy would discourage the attorneyemployer from inducing the attorney-employee to participate in or
overlook illegal schemes. Moreover, to allow such a remedy would
reinforce the integrity of the practice of law. This remedy would
further encourage attorneys to do the "right thing" in the face of
attorney-employers insistent on doing "the wrong thing."
CONCLUSION

[Stripping attorneys of a remedy in "whistle-blowing"
situations, reminds attorneys that] "it is economically more
to follow the dictates of the
advantageous to keep quiet than
35
Rules of Professional Conduct.

231. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill.

1981); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,

1405 (1967)).
232. Michael L. Closen & Mark E. Wojcik, Lawyers Out in the Cold, 73

A.B.A. J. 94, 96 (1987).
233. Id. at 94.
234. Stephen C. Dillard, When Principles Clash: The In-House Counsel as
Renegade or Whistleblower, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 210 (1996).
235. Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Il. 1998)

(Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman made this observation when the
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You were fired for refusing to violate your ethical duties. You
did not compromise client confidences. You are unable to find a
job because your former employer has indicated on your
employment records that you were fired for "unsatisfactory job
performance." You know this "unsatisfactory performance" was
the result of choosing to abide by your professional ethics instead
of participating in the unethical acts of your employer. You did
the "right thing" and even reported the misconduct of a fellow
attorney to the appropriate public authorities.
[TIhere is implied an understanding so fundamental to the
relationship and essential to its purpose as to require no expression:
that both the associate and the firm in conducting the practice will
do so in accordance with the ethical standards of the profession.
Erecting or countenancing disincentives to compliance with the
applicable rules of professional conduct.., would subvert the
central professional purpose of his relationship with the firm-the
lawful and ethical practice of law. 23
You, the attorney-employee, questioned the practices of your
attorney-employer, did the "right thing," and as a result were
Clearly, public interest mandates revealing improper
fired.
attorney conduct.
The Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide adequate
safeguards to protect the public interest. "[T]o say that the
categorical nature of ethical obligations is sufficient to ensure that
the ethical obligations will be satisfied simply ignores reality." =7
"Attorneys are no less human than non-attorneys and.., no less
given to the temptation to either ignore or rationalize away their
ethical obligations when complying... may render them unable to
feed and support their families."'
Attorneys need to be secure in knowing that their jobs are
safe if they remain faithful to those fundamental public policies
reflected in their professional ethics codes. Protection against the
wrongful discharge of attorneys fired for doing the "right thing"
when their attorney-employers are bent on doing the "wrong
thing" encourages honorable conduct and the reporting of
dishonest lawyers and promotes respect within the legal
profession.
Preserve your job or preserve your legal ethics? With the
allowance of a retaliatory discharge tort, attorney-employees are
no longer faced with "Hobson's choice." Attorneys must adhere to
their professional ethics, and they should expect their colleagues
Jacobson court disallowed a private attorney's claim for retaliatory discharge
based upon the attorney's refusal to violate his ethical obligations. Id.
236. Weider v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. 1992).
237. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ill. 1991) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
238. Id.
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to do the same. When attorneys acting as employers do not
respect their ethics and retaliate against attorney-employees for
"squealing" by depriving them of their livelihoods, protection
should be afforded to the honest attorney-employee for doing the
"right thing."

